The trajectories and potential internal and external repercussions of the battle for Mosul, on Jordan, overlap with the context of the non-traditional threat posed to Jordan's national security by ISIS.
Official assessments take into account the duration of the battle launched by the Iraqi government forces backed by the US-led international coalition on October 17, 2016, to liberate Mosul from ISIS. Contrary to expectations, the battle will not be an easy one, as the group is desperately utilizing all terrorist means to defend the existence of its stronghold in its self-proclaimed caliphate in Iraq's second most populated city. This means that the possibility of another humanitarian crisis taking place in the hands of the terrorist organization is not ruled out, where waves of refugees and displaced Iraqi civilians are moving to neighboring areas would follow.
Multiple Implications
Jordan is already reeling from humanitarian, political, security and social challenges due to the flow of around 1.4 million Syrian refugees over the course of the past five years of the Syrian crisis. However, Jordan's announcement that it is taking necessary measures to respond to any unusual cross-border movement does not exclude the possibility of receiving an additional wave of refugees that will result in doubling structural pressure on the state. This is particularly attributed to the current turbulence in the Arab regional landscape with no prospect of a solution in sight for the crises in Syria and Iraq, at least in the near future.
The potential problem is coupled with another security challenge emanating from developments on the ground over the course of the battle and the ensuing escape of an estimated 6000 ISIS fighters from the city, according to military experts, towards the Syrian provinces of Raqqa and Deir al-Zour and the Eastern Badia region. From a security perspective, this could pose a threat to the Jordanian borders where this flow could result in an increase in "sleeper cells" in Rukban and Hadalat areas on Jordan's north-eastern border with Syria. This in turn is linked to the course of a similar military operation to be conducted in the Syrian city of Raqqa to prevent ISIS militants from regrouping and posing a threat once again in their main stronghold in Raqqa.
The area of Rukban which is in proximity to ISIS' centers of activity represents a source of pressure on Jordan's national security. In June, the desert area witnessed the deadliest attack since the 2005 Amman bombings, when a car bomb targeted a military checkpoint near a refugee camp killing seven security officers and injuring 14 others. ISIS claimed responsibility for the unprecedented attack in which it managed to reach Jordanian targets, a sign demonstrating that the fight against the terrorist organization has moved to an advanced stage.
Following the attack, Jordan closed its borders with Syria in the area, but danger continues to loom. An average of 70,000 Syrian refugees are stranded in the refugee camp in Rukban, a desolate land between Jordan and Syria after they fled from ISIS-held territories in the east, which means elements of the group could infiltrate the border into Jordan and attempt to carry out a similar attack to the one perpetrated in Rukban.
Syria's southern Houran plateau, which is adjacent to Jordan's northern frontiers, is not an exception as it is subjected to a potential source of threat, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham. Acting in compliance to its leader Abu Mohammad al-Julani, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham changes its priorities from confining its operations to Syrian territory to include launching attacks inside Jordan using its supporters in the country. The current situation is similar to precedents of infiltration into Jordan and clashes with the country's army, leading to Jordan being caught between a rock and a hard place, adding further to existing tensions in the region.
What further escalates the external challenges are renewed clashes in the Iraqi town of Rutba in the Anbar province bordering eastern Jordan, between ISIS militants and Iraqi government forces after recapturing the town, and the group's sudden counter-attacks carried out to distract attention and ease the pressure on its militants in Mosul, as it did recently in Kirkuk.
The hit and run military operations conducted by ISIS militants in Rutba, located only 90 miles from Jordan, would fuel the persistent tension on the border, disrupting traffic and trade. This would prevent the re-opening of the Trebil crossing borders, a vital conduit for cheap oil to Jordan, and the international highway between the two countries which would disrupt the flow of Jordan's industrial and agricultural exports to Iraq.
Precautionary Measures
Jordan took the necessary precautionary measures to thwart any attempts by ISIS to infiltrate into its territory. Such measures include higher security alert levels, reinforced security presence to secure the 181-kilometer border with Iraq, strengthened fortifications along the 378-kilometer border with Syria, and advanced surveillance equipment for border guards to prevent any infiltration attempts from the uninhabited eastern desert that stretches over 120 kilometers between the Kingdom and Rutba, the closest Iraqi town.
Moreover, Jordan closed its northern border to prevent returning Jordanian militants from entering Jordan. The state used its relations with Iraqi political parties to curb ISIS' expansion and avoid a second setback in its relations with the Sunni community – like that of 2008 clashes with Iraqi Islamist factions: Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI), The 1920 Revolution Brigade, and Hamas of Iraq. Moreover, Jordan would not hesitate to engage in any regional security and military arrangements such as the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS.
Domestically, Jordan has intensified surveillance on members of the Salafi jihadist movement and those supporting ISIS, in particular, to expose any interrelations. It further takes advantage of any divisions between ISIS and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly Al-Nusra Front) to fortify the country's internal strengths while amending anti-terrorism legislation, criminalizing joining or promoting terrorist organizations, monitoring mosque and religious discourse, creating a commission to combat extremism as well as regulating related activities.
Threats from Within
The source of Jordan's fears extends beyond ISIS' expansion throughout the borders to become a domestic threat for the country, as there are more worrying indications emerging after two terrorist attacks took place in the Kingdom this year killing 6 Jordanian security officers. An ISIS-affiliated sleeper cell carried out an attack in the northern city of Irbid in March and a lone wolf, who switched his allegiance from al-Qaeda to ISIS, carried out another against an intelligence agency office near Amman in June.
Although the suspect was arrested and the terrorist attackers were killed in unprecedented confrontations with the Jordanian security forces, the attacks indicate new patterns of internal and external terrorist threats now facing Jordan at various levels. This shows a significant development in the nature of the conflict that could encourage members of ISIS in Jordan and supporters outside Jordan to perpetrate similar attacks threatening the state’s interests both domestically and globally.
The above is in line with historical enmity between Jordan and ISIS that has its roots in the reign of former al-Qaeda leader in Iraq, Ahmad Fadhil Nazal Al-Khalayleh, better known as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Al-Zarqawi planned and oversaw the implementation of 2005 Amman bombings which prompted Jordan to establish and back the tribal Sahwa groups, in the Anbar province in particular, and contribute to the efforts which led to the killing of al-Zarqawi in 2005. Zarqawi’s death could open the door for the organization's endeavors to avenge the killing of its leader, through plans to target Jordan in the coming period.
The foreign threats to Jordan's national security, the growth of the Salafi jihadist movement, and rising support for the educated Jordanian youth and well-off citizens for ISIS all coalesced to shape a new reality. Worrisome data of a recent Jordanian study shows that some 290,000 Jordanians support terrorist organizations and that the number of Jordanians- that are Salafi jihadists and others- who joined ISIS is increasing. Official estimates reveal that Salafi-jihadist movements are estimated to encompass between 2,500 to 3,000 militants, compared to only 1,500. These militants will pose an impending threat when they return to Jordan bringing home their fighting experience inspired by al-Qaeda's agenda. The situation would be similar to that of returning fighters from Iraq and Afghanistan and could even lead to attacks similar to the ones perpetrated between 2002 and 2005 culminating in the Amman bombings.
With no political solutions in sight for the Iraqi and Syrian crises, the motivating environment of ISIS would encourage the organization’s expansion inside Jordan, furthered by weighting factors that are close to assessment of the organization or the Salafi jihadist movement, in particular with the severe economic situation in Jordan is taken into account. That is, the group seeks to take advantage of unemployment and poverty rates estimated at 14 and 13 per cent, respectively, representing a source of concern in southern areas and the Ma'an Governorate in particular. Recruiters could use this to attract supporters, from the youth, in particular, presenting them with an enticing model of a caliphate and promising to pull them out of their difficult situation, living conditions and marginalization but without bringing forward a clearly identified plan for finding solutions.
This discourse is attracting more youth who are not only affiliated with Jordan's Salafi jihadist movement but those who come from various educational and social backgrounds. That is because the current model is no longer confined to members of the middle or lower classes. All the while new Jordanian "muhajirun" (the emigrants) prefer to join ISIS and not Jabhat Fateh al-Sham.
For many members of the Salafi jihadist movement, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is the successor of al-Zarqawi in Jordan, therefore the fact that ISIS prevails in some Jordanian cities is a continuance of what al-Zarqawi represented. That is, members of ISIS and followers of al-Zarqawi represent the new generation of a more radical generation of Salafi jihadists. This generation is less affected by clerics and those who issue fatwas (religious decrees), and are more in favor of field commanders due to their qualities of strength, their use of violence and their authority that carries a vital importance for the organization.
A large number of fighters are put on trial in the state’s security courts include scores of intellectual and field leaders as well as those influenced by the ideology embraced by the Salafi jihadist movement. This pattern indicates that the environment that produced this movement is transforming into a Salafi jihadist incubator in some Jordanian areas, including those that are already main strongholds of the movement or those newly-created ones.
In conclusion, the scenario of ISIS' exacerbating expansion into Jordanian territory is an unlikely one, at least in the short term due to several factors. The organization is busy in current battles and its loss of control over many of its territories and lacks a favorable environment for sectarian and confessional collision in which it thrives. Other factors include the severe divisions that prevailed between the Salafi jihadists during the Syrian and Iraqi crises where some of the movement leaders opposed ISIS. However, ISIS continues to pose a dual internal and external security threat to Jordan where, due to the global coalition's operations, it may transform into sleeper cells that are more effective in carrying out sudden terrorist attacks. This possibility requires joint efforts at various levels in Jordan to form a force that can rid the country of the threat posed by the organization on its territory.
